top of page

Novice Karate Group (ages 8 & up)

Публічна·39 учасників


The -but in rebut once meant basically "butt", so rebut's original meanings were "to drive or beat back" and "to attack with violent language". Rebuttals can still be rather violent, as anyone who has watched some heated moments in a presidential debate can testify. The word is often used by lawyers, since the lawyer for the accused or for the party being sued almost always tries to rebut the charges against his or her client; but it's also used in plenty of contexts outside the courtroom.


Download Zip:

Also in Middle English "assail (someone) with violent language, rebuke" (c. 1300); "repel in battle, repulse" (mid-14c.). The legalese sense of "try to disprove, refute by evidence or argument, bring counter-argument against" is attested by 1817. Related: Rebutted; rebutting.

The rebuttal appeared in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, the same journal that ran the original 2015 paper. Several of the nearly two dozen researchers say they were driven to act because the original authors declined to publish what they viewed as necessary corrections, and the findings were influencing state and federal policy proposals.

But among other criticisms, the rebuttal released Monday argues that Jacobson and his coauthors dramatically miscalculated the amount of hydroelectric power available and seriously underestimated the cost of installing and integrating large-scale underground thermal energy storage systems.

Objectives: 'Nanny-state' accusations can function as powerful rhetorical weapons against interventions intended to promote public health. Public health advocates often lack effective rebuttals to these criticisms. Nanny-state accusations are largely accusations of paternalism. They conjure up emotive concern about undue governmental interference undermining peoples' autonomy. But autonomy can be understood in various ways. We outline three main conceptions of autonomy, argue that these that can underpin three different conceptions of paternalism, and consider implications for responses to nanny-state accusations and the assessment of public health interventions.

Conclusion: Relational conceptions of autonomy and paternalism offer public health policymakers and practitioners a means for rebutting nanny-state accusations, and can support more nuanced and more appropriately demanding appraisals of public health interventions.

The rebuttable-presumption component complicates your case, whether you are the the person who wants the presumption to apply or are the person seeking to rebut the presumption. This requirement holds the person attempting to rebut the presumption to a higher burden of proof and can be very confusing for persons attempting to represent themselves.

A transfer from a grantor to a person in a confidential or fiduciary relationship with the grantor is presumptively the product of undue influence. On appeal, the niece argued that she successfully rebutted the elements to establish undue influence.[i] However, the court noted that is not the correct standard. To refute this presumption, the grantee must show that she acted in good faith and that the grantor acted freely, intelligently, and voluntarily. Jackson v. Schrader, 676 N.W.2d 599, 605 (Iowa 2003).

Additionally, there was no evidence that Halter acted freely, intelligently, and voluntarily. Halter was not informed that her sister and niece would have survivorship rights as co-owners of the accounts. This would directly contradict her plan to leave her estate to her grandson. Therefore, the Court of Appeals affirmed that the niece failed to rebut the presumption of undue influence.

First of all, there is a clear dichotomy between total disability under Labor Code Section 4662 and partial disability under Labor Code Section 4660. Permanent total disability is determined in accordance with the fact, which means outside the schedule. (The schedule is not based on facts; it is based upon a legal presumption.) On the other hand, permanent partial disability is to be determined based upon the rating schedule; however, that schedule is rebuttable.

While it is true that a radical enough change in the factors used to assess something may indicate some alteration in the thing being measured, a closer look at the statutory language, the case law, and the AMAG compels the conclusion that the definition of permanent disability has not materially changed and that vocational evidence remains relevant and useful to rebut an inaccurate scheduled rating. This is discussed in more detail below.

Barring vocational evidence regarding PD to rebut the PDRS would violate this objective by divorcing the rating from occupation (work disability) and leaving some injured workers worse off than under the prior rating/rebuttal regime.

Labor Code Section 4660.1(d) maintains the longstanding language providing that the PDRS is rebuttable. However, it does not in any way limit the rebuttal methodology. Are we to assume the Legislature repealed decades of case law sub silentio?

Because the schedule is rebuttable, and permanent disability is a decreased capacity to meet occupational demands, then vocational evidence is relevant to prove the extent of work disability. The Labor Code requires that the Board consider occupation in determining disability, and the AMAG (which has been adopted by statute) explicitly endorses vocational evidence. Nothing in the statute or the case law provides otherwise. Thus vocational evidence remains relevant and admissible to rebut an inaccurate scheduled PD rating.

This article analyzes the antireductionist argument from renormalization group explanations of universality and shows how it can be rebutted if one assumes that the explanation in question is captured by the counterfactual dependence account of explanation.

Notwithstanding the above language from Basic, courts have disagreed as to the types of evidence that can be used to rebut the presumption, and, in particular, whether evidence relevant to the materiality element may also be used to show a lack of price impact at the certification stage. It has also been unclear who has the burden of persuasion as to the applicability (or non-applicability) of the presumption.

The plaintiffs moved for class certification, invoking the Basic presumption. In response, Goldman sought to rebut the presumption by showing a lack of price impact. The District Court certified the class, but the Second Circuit vacated that order. Specifically, the Second Circuit held that although Goldman bore the burden of persuasion (and thus was required to show a lack of price impact by a preponderance of the evidence), the District Court had erred by holding Goldman to an even higher standard and refusing to consider some of its price impact evidence.

Often in bankruptcy cases involving a debtor with a non-filing spouse, the presumption of equal ownership arises. Subject to certain exclusions, Section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code provides that all property in which the debtor has a legal or equitable ownership interest becomes property of the estate at the commencement of the case. This includes property the debtor owns with a non-filing spouse. In some situations, particularly if the debtor does not have an exemption available, the debtor will try to rebut the presumption of equal ownership.

Through the presumption of equal ownership, courts presume that assets jointly owned are also equally owned. In some instances a debtor will attempt to rebut the presumption of equal ownership by arguing that the debtor's interest is not property of the bankruptcy estate because the debtor did not purchase or contribute to the asset.

The Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Michigan has held that debtors and non-filing spouses lose any defense and right to rebut the presumption of equal ownership once a debtor's spouse purchases an asset, regardless if the asset was purchased solely from the non-filing spouse's funds, with the debtor's name included as a joint owner with rights of ownership and benefit. In re Olson, 424 BR 770, 772-773 (Bank. E.D. Mich. 2010).

The issue in Olson was whether the debtor's one-half interest in an annuity account that had been funded solely with proceeds from her non-filing spouse's settlement proceeds was property of the estate. The debtor argued that she had properly rebutted the presumption of equal ownership by showing that her non-filing spouse solely contributed the funds to purchase the annuity and that, therefore, no part of the annuity was property of her estate. Id. at 772.

The Bankruptcy Court went on - assuming arguendo that the presumption did apply - to hold that the debtor could not rebut the presumption of equal ownership. Id. The Court reasoned that "[o]nce the Debtor's spouse purchased an asset in which Debtor has equal ownership and equal benefits, he lost any defense that the annuity belongs entirely to him." Id.

Interestingly, the Court also noted that to the extent the presumption of equal ownership applied at all, the Trustee also had the right to rebut the presumption and assert that the annuity contract allowed the debtor to withdraw 100% of the assets, and that therefore, the Trustee had the right to seek 100% of the assets. Id.

There are two main factors I take into accounts when deciding what to rebut. The first is the logical significance of the point and their case structure. Most cases follow one of two logical structures. First: 041b061a72

Про групу

Welcome to the group! You can connect with other members, ge...


bottom of page